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In the 2008 Presidential campaign, the American public was reminded
time and again of the differences in the economic policies of the nominees:
John McCain would cut taxes,2 and Barack Obama would raise them,
although only on those earning over $250,000. 3 In the final days of the
1. Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Harvard Law School,
J.D. 2007; jennifer.bird-pollan@ropesgray.com. The author would like to thank
Professors Alvin Warren and Daniel Halperin of Harvard Law School for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article. The views reflected in this article are the
author's alone and do not reflect the views of Ropes & Gray LLP.
2. McCAiN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, JOBS FOR AMERICA: THE MCCAIN
EcoNoMIc PLAN 13 (2008), http://www.scribd.com/doc/4296859/John-McCains-
Jobs-for-America. McCain's final plan included cutting the corporate tax rate from
35% to 25% and maintaining the reduced tax rate of 15% on capital gains and
dividends. Id. McCain did not explicitly promise to reduce tax rates on individuals,
although he stated he would "[k]eep [t]ax [riates low." Id.
3. OBAMA PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, BARACK OBAMA'S COMPREHENSIVE TAX
PLAN 1, 6 (2008), http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/FactsheetTaxPlan
FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). Despite the regular refrain that, if elected,
Obama would raise taxes, Obama's final plan actually promised to provide an up-to-
$1000 "Making Work Pay" refundable tax credit to many taxpayers, as well as a
refundable mortgage interest tax credit. Id. at 2. Obama also committed to expanding
the reach of the EITC. Id.
1
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campaign, the McCain camp accused Obama of proposing "redistribution,"
and the Obama camp quickly denied that description.4  So why do
presidential candidates run so quickly from the r-word? McCain's senior
policy advisor equated redistribution with socialism, 5 but redistribution, in the
form of the federal income tax system, is a central tenet of American
democracy. Indeed, the very notion of having a tax system at all - in which
amounts are collected from certain members of society in order to benefit
other members - fits a classic definition of redistribution.
One central element of the American version of redistribution comes in
the form of the Earned Income Tax Credit (the "EITC"). In his campaign
platform, Barack Obama vowed to expand the EITC, making it available to
more taxpayers than ever before.6 Given the outcome of the 2008 election,
and President Obama's seeming commitment to the tenets of redistribution
(despite his disavowal of the word) and his express promise to expand the
reach of the EITC, as well as the recent changes to the EITC introduced by
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the "ARRA") 7, it
seems a perfect time to look at the intent behind, and accomplishments of, the
EITC as it currently stands, and the role it can (and will) play in the future of
the U.S. federal income tax system.
I begin this article with a review of the history of the EITC and an
examination of the form it currently takes. I then turn to a review of some of
the difficulties presented by the EITC, and some recurring criticisms it has
faced since its inception. In the context of this discussion, I also introduce
responses to those criticisms, both within the framework of the EITC as it is
currently administered and in the form of possible adjustments that might
serve to improve the system.
II. HISTORY OF THE EITC
The EITC was instituted in response to the "Family Assistance Plan"
("FAP") proposed by President Richard Nixon in 1969,8 which was itself an
attempt to implement a version of a negative income tax in the U.S. income
tax system.9 Nixon intended the FAP to be "a new and drastically different
4. Foon Rhee, McCain Slams Obama on 'Redistribution of Wealth', POL.
INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintellige
nce/2008/10/mccain slams ob_3.html.
5. Id. "'Europeans call it socialism, Americans call it welfare, and Barack
Obama calls it change."' Id. (quoting McCain Senior Policy Adviser Douglas Holtz-
Eakin).
6. OBAMA PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 115.
8. Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-
Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAx L. REV. 301, 303 (2004).
9. Robert A. Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S.
Welfare Policy, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 119, 122. In contrast to a
[Vol. 74
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approach to the way in which government cares for those in need." 10 The
FAP was effectively a form of welfare, with the caveat that recipients would
have to show that they were attempting to find work. 1 But even with this
caveat, there was no requirement in the FAP that recipients be working or
earning any income.' Under the plan, all families would be entitled to an
annual income of $500 per person for the first two family members, with
$300 for each additional family member. 3 In addition, the "work incentive"
element of the plan allowed recipients to keep the first $720 of any earnings,
plus half of any additional family income up to $4000, without losing FAP
eligibility.1 4 This proposal "would have established in law an unmistakably
liberal principle: a federally guaranteed [minimum] income." 15 However, the
political difficulty of these proposals proved insurmountable, and after
passing the House, the FAP was defeated in the Senate.' 6 Critics saw the plan
as a work disincentive, in particular because the FAP's "guaranteed income"
was joined with a high phase-out rate, so that each additional dollar of income
earned by the FAP recipient resulted in a loss of 50 cents of FAP subsidy. 7
In response to Nixon's failed proposal, Senator Russell Long (D-LA)
developed an alternative proposal incorporating a requirement that people
who receive the credit work and earn income. Long, who was, at the time,
chair of the Senate Finance Committee, led the campaign that resulted in the
enactment of the EITC as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.18 The first
EITC was only available to taxpayers with earned income and at least one
child. 19 The maximum credit in 1975 was $400.20 In 1986, the EITC was
indexed for inflation and made a permanent (as these things go) part of the
traditional income tax, where taxpayers pay some portion of their income to the
government, under a negative income tax the government supplements the income of
the lowest earning (and non-earning) members of society. Id. at 119.
10. President Richard M. Nixon, Welfare-'Workfare' Speech (Aug. 8, 1969), in
27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1517, 1517 (1969).
11. H.R. REP. No. 91-904, at 20-23 (1970).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at4.
15. E. J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 196 (2d ed. 2004).
16. Statement About House Approval of the Family Assistance Act of 1970, 1
PUB. PAPERS 364 (Apr. 16, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=2467&st=&stl =.
17. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 303-04. For example, assume a taxpayer was
entitled to a FAP subsidy of $500. If that taxpayer earns an additional $100 of
income, she would lose $50 of her FAP subsidy. This means, effectively, that
working to earn an additional $100 of income puts this taxpayer only $50 ahead
financially.
18. Marguerite Casey Found., The Earned Income Tax Credit: Analysis and
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tax system. 21 In 1990, Congress made a larger credit available to families
with two or more children, and President Clinton and the 1993 Congress
significantly increased the EITC for all recipients. The 1993 changes also
allowed childless taxpayers between the ages of 25 and 64 to claim a small
EITC.22  Finally, in 2001, Congress attempted to address the "marriage
penalty" inherent in the EITC23 by raising the income ceiling for married
taxpayers filing jointly.24 Much of the recent history of the EITC has
centered on an attempt to deal with fraud and general noncompliance with
regard to claiming the credit. I will explore these issues in detail later in the
article.26
The latest changes to the EITC were made by the ARRA, as part of the
2009 Stimulus Package. For tax years beginning after Decemer 31, 2008,
credit amounts will increase and income ceilings, for purposes of determining
EITC eligibility, will be raised. Perhaps most notably, the new law adds a
new category of credit recipient: taxpayers with three or more children.
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The EITC is a powerful tool in the U.S. government's redistributive
program. The largest program of its kind, the EITC is administered by the
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") through the federal income tax system.
In 2003, the EITC benefited 19.6 million families, providing $34 billion in
tax credits (either in the form of an offset to taxes due, or in the form of a
27cash refund). Part of what makes the EITC so unique is its construction as
"a complex hybrid of an earnings subsidy, a traditional income-transfer
program, and a tax credit program.
28
21. Id. at 1672.
22. Id.
23. For a discussion of marriage penalties and how they relate to the EITC, see
infra Part W.B.
24. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1672.
25. See Internal Revenue Service, EITC Due Diligence Compliance Program,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=179024,00.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2009).
26. See infra Part IV.D.2.
27. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1676.
28. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 540 (1995).
(Vol. 74
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A. Mechanics of the EITC
The current EITC is not available to individuals with no earned income.
That is to say, the EITC is only available to taxpayers after they have earned
their first dollar of income. 29 However, the phase-out scheme of the EITC
means that not all taxpayers with earned income are eligible to receive the
credit, either. In fact, both the phase-in and phase-out rates applicable to a
given taxpayer depend on the number of children in the household.3 ° In
2008, for example, for taxpayers claiming no children, the credit was
eliminated at $12,880 ($15,880 for married taxpayers filing a joint return).
For taxpayers with one qualifying child the credit would be eliminated at
$33,995 ($36,995 for married taxpayers filing a joint return). For taxpayers
with two or more qualifying children, the credit was eliminated at $38,646
($41,646 for married taxpayers filing a joint return). 3 1 The phase-in rates
vary equally depending on the number of children a taxpayer claims. These
figures comprise Table 1.32
29. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT:
ARE You ELIGIBLE? 9 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 596].
30. The more children a taxpayer has, the larger her tax credit will be. However,
in tax year 2008, the credit does not increase further if a taxpayer has more than two
children. Id. at 5. Under the ARRA, the new EITC category of three or more
children will increase the credit amount for taxpayers with three children, but, again,
families with more than three children will not receive a larger credit to account for
their larger families. For a longer discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV.B.
31. All of these figures come from the Tax Policy Center's webpage. Tax Policy
Center, Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, 1975-2009, http://www.taxpolicycen
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TABLE I
Number of Phase-in Rate Phase-Out Rate Credit
Qualifying Elimination Point
Children
Single - no 7.65% over first 7.65% $12,880
children $5,720
Joint - no 7.65% over first 7.65% $15,880
children $5,720
Single - one child 34% over first 15.98% $33,995
$8,580
Joint - one child 34% over first 15.98% $36,995
$8,580
Single - two or 40% over first 21.06% $38,646
more children $12,060
Joint - two or 40% over first 21.06% $41,646
more children $12,060
As is illustrated by this table, the largest credit available through the
EITC in 2008 was $4,824. This maximum credit amount was available to
married taxpayers filing jointly with two or more qualifying children and an
adjusted gross income ("AGI") of between $12,060 and $18,750, or single
taxpayers with two or more qualifying children and an AGI of between
$12,060 and $15,750. 33
33. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 44.
[Vol. 74
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To illustrate further, consider the following example. For the 2008 tax
year, a single taxpayer with two children and $7,000 of earned income is
entitled to a credit of $2,810. However, if that same taxpayer were to have
$13,000 in earned income, she would be entitled to the maximum credit
amount of $4,824. But then further, if this taxpayer's income were to
increase to $25,000, the credit amount would drop back down to $2,869. If
this taxpayer's earned income were to exceed $38,600, she would no longer
be entitled to any tax credit under the EITC. This phasing-in and phasing
back out of the credit amount (as demonstrated in the table below) is intended
to focus the benefits of the credit on the neediest taxpayers.
TABLE 2






In order to receive the EITC, a taxpayer must first meet certain
prerequisites and avoid potential disqualifications. First, recipients must file
a tax return, which, in certain instances, they would not otherwise be required
to do.34 Also, only taxpayers with valid social security numbers are eligible
to receive the EITC.35 There are also certain things that can disqualify a
taxpayer from receiving the EITC. For instance, if a taxpayer is within the
qualifying amounts of earned income but also has above a certain amount of
capital gains income or certain other kinds of investment income, that person
will be ineligible for the EITC.36 In addition, if a taxpayer is found to have
fraudulently claimed the EITC in a past year or claimed more than she was
entitled to, she may be prohibited from claiming the EITC in future tax
years. 37 If an EITC claim contains an "error... attributable to reckless or
intentional disregard of the rules," then the taxpayer making the claim will be
denied the credit for the next two years.
38
34. See id. at 22.
35. See id. at 5.
36. Id. at 7; I.R.C. § 32(i).
37. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 26; I.R.C. § 32(k)(B)(i).
38. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1675; I.R.C. § 32(k)(B)(ii).
2009]
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One central characteristic of the EITC is that amounts granted under the
credit are fully refundable to the taxpayer.39  Most credits available to
taxpayers through the U.S. federal income tax system are only available to
offset taxes owed.40 Generally, therefore, if a taxpayer's credits exceed the
amount of tax she owes, she essentially forfeits the difference. However,
because the EITC is fully refundable, even if the taxpayer owes no tax, she
will be eligible to receive as a refund the entire amount of the EITC to which
she is entitled.41 Because the credit only applies to very low income earners,
who often owe little to nothing in tax, if the credit were not refundable, it is
likely that most of the current recipients would not be able to use it at all.
Because of the U.S. federal income tax system's standard deduction and
dependency exemptions, many EITC recipients fall below the income level at
which taxpayers first owe tax. Moreover, those EITC recipients who do owe
tax to the government often owe significantly less than the total amount of
their EITC. However, because the EITC is refundable, these taxpayers are
still able to take full advantage of the credit.
B. Reasons for Implementing the EITC
One of the greatest difficulties facing anyone studying the EITC is the
lack of any explicit Congressional purpose for the credit. As Lawrence
Zelenak writes, the EITC is "undertheorized" since Congress has never
provided "legislative history explaining the purpose of the credit, except in
the vaguest and most general terms. ' 42 This lack of articulated purpose has
plagued the EITC from its inception and has been the cause of much
difficulty in the process of revising and improving it.43 In fact, not only was
there no expressed purpose in creating the EITC, various reports offer
conflicting intentions and purposes. These different EITC proponents likely
have quite different ideas about what the purpose of the EITC is or should be:
The somewhat incoherent nature of current law might be the result
of a compromise between conflicting visions of the credit's
purpose, rather than the lack of any clear vision, but it is difficult
39. I.R.C. § 32(a)(1).
40. For instance, the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits are nonrefundable,
and are therefore limited to, at most, the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer claiming
the credit. See I.R.C. § 25A(a).
41. The "Allowance of Credit" section of the Code does not limit the amount of
the credit to the amount of tax owed, but rather says that the credit may not "exceed
the earned income amount." I.R.C. § 32(a)(1).
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or impossible to find attractive accounts of the purpose of the
credit even in the academic literature.44
Anne Alstott points out that the absence of an explicit purpose makes for
more than just a confused discussion.45 In fact, without a stated purpose, any
discussion of the EITC will involve many built-in normative assumptions,
which may very well pre-determine the outcome of that discussion. As
Alstott writes, "for analytic clarity, critics.., should make their goals explicit
and thus open to debate.
'A7
In the first reports on the institution of the EITC, there were many
references to the increasing burden of payroll taxes, in particular the burden
these taxes represented for earners on the lowest end of the pay scale. a In
addition, early commentators seemed especially concerned that rising food
and energy costs were hitting low-income families the hardest and that the
government ought to find some way to compensate families for those costs.
Offsetting the burden of payroll taxes is repeatedly mentioned as a purpose
for the creation of the EITC, but at the same time, some EITC proponents
argue for its continuation on the basis of the benefits it provides for families
and its ability to respond to the adjustment in the poverty level given different
family sizes. 9 These reasons ultimately have little to do with the burden of
payroll taxes.
These two recurring themes appear repeatedly in the discussion of the
purpose of the EITC. On the one hand, original proponents of the credit saw
its purpose as offsetting payroll taxes for the lowest income earners.
50
Indeed, the current rate of the credit for recipients with no qualifying children
(7.65%) exactly equals the current rate of the payroll tax. This seems to be
strong evidence that the underlying rationale of the EITC is linked to payroll
taxes, at least for those EITC recipients without qualifying children. On the
other hand, the EITC is often promoted as a response to the difference
between lower incomes and the official poverty level. The difference in the
44. Id. at 346.
45. Alstott, supra note 28, at 558.
46. Clearly, the concern that an argument contains presuppositions that
determine its outcome is not a new one, and this worry arises in numerous contexts.
The reason it is of particular importance here is that the history of the EITC has never
made clear the rationale for its existence, so the arguments of both proponents and
critics are stuck with no clear starting place.
47. Alstott, supra note 28, at 558.
48. AvIvA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORrrIES, ANALYSIS OF
SESSIONS AMENDMENT TO DENY THE EITC TO PEOPLE WORKING HERE LEGALLY AS A
RESULT OF THE SENATE IMMIGRATION BILL 2 (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/6-5-
07imm.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Payroll taxes include one-half of the Social Security tax (with the other half
being paid by the employer) and the Medicare tax. These are known collectively as
FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) taxes.
20091
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credit amount and income ceiling level for taxpayers with one child or with
two or more children (and, beginning in 2009, the new EITC category of
three or more children) seems to be strong evidence of this second purpose.
If the intention of the credit were merely to offset the burden of payroll taxes,
there would be no reason to adjust the credit amount in relation to family
size. 51 Since the credit is currently indexed for inflation and adjusted in
response to family size, it seems likely that one additional purpose of the
EITC is to supplement the income of working families whose earnings level
still leaves them below the official poverty level.52 I will return later in the
article to a discussion of whether or not these two purposes may be
incompatible and whether the EITC in its current form effectively satisfies
these two goals.53
C. Comparison of the EITC and Other Federal Subsidy Programs
As a program of redistribution and support for the poorest members of
society, the EITC is quite important. It can, of course, never be a complete
substitute for welfare, since the EITC provides no benefits to those with no
earned income.54 Indeed, "earnings subsidies [such as the EITC] are
regressive in their low ranges, providing fewer benefits to more needy
families rather than greater benefits. 55 In order to support those members of
society with no wage earnings, the United States continues to administer a
traditional welfare system in addition to the EITC. However, because the
EITC is targeted at the working poor, it is able to affect significantly larger
numbers of people than traditional welfare. In order to see the relative
importance of the EITC, it is useful to view the benefits it provides in
comparison with those offered by some of the biggest redistribution programs
in the United States. In 2003, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) program (the program most commonly known as welfare) provided
5624.5 billion in aid to 2.1 million families. The federal food stamps program
gave $21 billion in benefits to 7.4 million families.57 This comparison is
illustrated in Table 3.58
51. Indeed, even the adjustment in income ceilings for childless workers on the
basis of married filing jointly status does not make much sense if the exclusive
purpose of the credit is to offset payroll taxes.
52. For EITC income categories and ceiling limits, see IRS PUBLICATION 596,
supra note 29.
53. See infra Part V.
54. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 9.
55. Moffitt, supra note 9, at 132.
56. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1676-77.
57. Id. at 1677.
58. Id. at 1676-77.
[Vol. 74
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TABLE 3
Name of Program Number of Families Amount of Aid
receiving Assistance provided
TANF 2.1 million $24.5 billion
Food Stamps 7.4 million $21 billion
EITC 19.6 million $34 billion
As this comparison illustrates, the EITC in its current form provides
significantly more in subsidies and affects a much larger number of families
than either TANF or the federal food stamps program. This is not in itself an
argument for the EITC's continued existence, but it is at least a reason both to
evaluate the program as it is currently administered and to determine if a
more effective administration is possible.
D. EITC as a Component of the Income Tax System
Many of the criticisms surrounding the EITC are connected to the idea
that such a large, complicated, and progressive redistribution program is
administered in a covert way through the federal income tax system. I will
return to an examination of these criticisms later in this article, 59 but here I
would like to lay out the arguments for incorporating the EITC within the
income tax system. One argument for this integration lies with one of the
original purposes of the EITC: if the credit is meant to offset the burden
placed on taxpayers by payroll taxes, then giving taxpayers a refundable tax
credit on their federal income tax return seems a logical solution. In addition,
administration through the tax system makes the credit more readily
accessible to most recipients. Registering for TANF requires much
paperwork and many background checks that are simply not required for the
EITC.60 Since the U.S. tax system relies on self-reporting, there are no proof
59. For a discussion of these criticisms, see infra Part IV.
60. TANF is a federal program, but is administered through the individual states.
Therefore, each state must determine what certification requirements will be required
for TANF recipients within that state. In Massachusetts, for example, potential
applicants are required to meet with a representative of the Department of
Transitional Assistance before they can receive the application materials for any kind
of financial assistance administered through that department. Massachusetts Office of
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requirements for the EITC.6' This means that people who are either
intimidated by or uninformed about the requirements for TANF can much
more easily claim the EITC. Moreover, a credit system run through the IRS
and the income tax system avoids many of the stigmas associated with
traditional welfare. Since the EITC is only available to those taxpayers who
have earned income, recipients of the credit may be less subject to the
criticism that society has heaped on welfare recipients.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE EITC
At this point I will turn to an examination of some of the most common
criticisms of the EITC and some possible responses to them. I do not purport
to have compiled an exhaustive list of complaints, but I do believe that by the
end of this discussion, I will have shown that the EITC should remain as one
of the U.S. government's tools in the battle against poverty.
A. Work Disincentives
One repeated theme in the criticisms of the EITC, as well as of almost
all government-run wealth redistribution programs, is the problem of work
disincentives. Any welfare program that has a 100% phase-out rate will have
the effect, so the argument goes, of disincentivizing work on the part of the
62
recipients. 2 If each additional dollar earned results in the loss of a dollar of
welfare, the potential recipient has no incentive to work to earn that extra
dollar. Indeed, the "rational" person will choose not to work, since welfare
will provide the same level of income and allow the person leisure time as
well. Of course, such arguments are based on the assumption that welfare
recipients are making purely numbers-based decisions and that there is no (or
very little) value for them to work as such. These arguments also ignore the
stigma attached to the status of "welfare recipient," which itself may serve as
something of a work incentive. 63 In any case, the design of the EITC is
2=Basic+Needs&L3=Financial+Assistance&sid=Eeohhs2&b=terminalcontent&f=-dta
_c_fmassistapply&csid=Eeohhs2 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
61. There are many arguments in favor of requiring pre -certification to claim the
EITC. I will address these later in this article. For a discussion of these, see infra
Part IV.D.2.
62. V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 163 (Robert A.
Moffitt ed., 2003).
63. The idea that receiving welfare is shameful may be a uniquely American
phenomenon. "Ideally, the poor and disadvantaged would be better off with a system
of social provisions that recognized public assistance as a matter of right - as an
entitlement - much like the basic income guarantees in many countries throughout the
world." Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the
EITC, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1261, 1267 (2007).
[Vol. 74
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intended to minimize the problem of work disincentives. Since the credit is
only available to citizens with earned income, the EITC has a built-in work
incentive. In addition, the phase-out rates are significantly less than 100%, so
that each additional dollar earned within the phase-out income levels results
in a loss of mere cents on the dollar in credit. Because of these
characteristics, the EITC is politically much more viable than traditional
welfare systems because it avoids most of the work disincentive problems
created by welfare in its more common forms.
One potential problem in the EITC with regard to work incentives lies in
the high marginal rates experienced by taxpayers who find themselves in the
phase-out levels of the credit. Since each additional dollar of income earned
within the EITC phase-out range results in a reduction of the EITC received,
taxpayers in this range experience a marginal tax rate equal to that reduction.
For example, a single taxpayer with one qualifying child and an AGI of
between $14,810 and $32,001 faces a phase-out rate of 15.98%. So if a
taxpayer in this category earned $20,000, she would be subject to the 15.98%
phase-out rate.64 That is to say, the next $100 she earned would be a net gain
of only $84.02 since she would lose $15.98 of the EITC she received before
she earned that last $100.65 This marginal rate problem is exacerbated when
the EITC recipient is also subject to a positive tax rate. If the additional $100
of income earned by this taxpayer is subject to a 15% positive tax rate, she
will only net $85 in after-tax income. This positive tax rate, in combination
with the marginal rate created by the EITC phase-out, subjects this taxpayer
to a marginal rate of 30.98%, significantly higher than many other taxpayers
earning much more than she is. This very large marginal tax rate means
that her additional $100 of earned income will net her only $69.02.67 When
this marginal rate is combined with the effect of her higher income on her
eligibility for other government assistance programs or other tax credits, that
rate may grow even higher. 68  In this way, the EITC does have a work
64. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 45.
65. This taxpayer's salary of $20,000 entitles her to a credit of $2,232, for a total
of $22,232. However, if her income were to increase to $20,100, she would only be
eligible for a credit of $2,216, for a total of $22,316. Therefore, although her salary
increased by $100, she only takes home an additional $84.
66. The rate of 30.98% comes from a combination of the positive tax rate (which
is the basic income tax rate) and the loss of the EITC (which can be seen as a
constructive tax of sorts).
67. A similar discussion and illustration of the effect of marginal tax rates on
taxpayers subject to the phase-out rate of the EITC can be found in SAUL D. HOFFMAN
& LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 11-12 (1990).
68. The loss of eligibility for food stamps, welfare, and other government
assistance programs, while clearly not an explicit tax, will reduce income to the
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disincentive built into it.69 Since the EITC is intended to benefit the lowest-
income earners, it must incorporate a phase-out system in order to focus its
benefits on its intended recipients. Without such a phase-out, the EITC
would be available to all taxpayers, which is not the kind of tax credit
Congress intended to create with the EITC. Therefore, although the EITC is
designed to minimize work disincentives, the problem, to some degree,
remains and, indeed, seems unavoidable, because the credit is designed to
phase-out at higher income levels.
Louis Kaplow argues that the work disincentives created by the EITC
and the high marginal tax rates that it produces may actually be optimal,
economically speaking.7°  If the high marginal rates result in work
disincentives focused specifically on low-skilled workers, Kaplow argues,
this may be an optimal result. Of course, this argument cannot completely
justify the high marginal rates of the EITC and the work disincentives
produced by those rates, because it is not possible to determine whether it is
only, or even primarily, lower-ability individuals who are disincentivized to
work by those high rates. Kaplow writes:
[S]uppose that it is possible to observe perfectly which individuals
have abilities below some low level .... Then that group can be
given a high transfer [grant], which would not be very costly to
finance because [the grant] could be fairly low for everyone else
without fear that such individuals would be destitute since, by
assumption, they all can earn at least a minimal income.7'
Much of Kaplow's argument, as he himself acknowledges, hinges on being
able to identify those members of society with higher and lower work abilities
in order to determine the optimality of work incentives and disincentives.
Kaplow admits, "[S]ignals about ability will be noisy. Even though some
features, such as age or certain disabilities, can be observed nearly perfectly
at low cost, there will usually be differences in ability associated with these
characteristics. And other traits, including some disabilities, cannot be
observed perfectly." 72  This discussion of the necessity of grants to the
lowest-ability workers (as well as the difficulty associated with identifying
those workers) will be an important part of the section of this article
discussing the relation between welfare and the EITC.73
69. This so-called work disincentive may be unavoidable, and not only in the
context of the EITC, given the necessities of a progressive tax system. Indeed, a
progressive tax structure in general may be viewed as a work disincentive.
70. Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIc ECONOMICS (2008).
71. Id. at 165.
72. Id.
73. See infra Part IV.D.2.
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Even given the potential optimality of work disincentives, Kaplow also
argues that there may be externalities that influence whether or not work
disincentives will be a positive thing.
It is often suggested, for example, that parents serve as role models
for their children, so the failure to work perpetuates poverty,
harming both the children (and future generations) and others, such
as by increasing crime. Additionally, individuals who work,
having less free time, may themselves be less likely to engage in
criminal activity. Also, there may be a psychological externality to
other citizens who derive utility (or avoid negative utility) from the
fact that lower-income transfer recipients work. On the other hand,
if parents, especially single parents, are encouraged or forced to
leave the home for a greater period of time, child care and
• - 74
supervision may suffer.
Kaplow is arguing that, at a minimum, the question of whether or not work
incentives are to be avoided is one that requires further study. Indeed, this is
likely an empirical question, although any empirical results will have to be
evaluated in light of policy choices about what ends the EITC is intended to
achieve.
In contrast, Anne Alstott points out that talk of "work disincentives" in
the context of the EITC may be paternalistic and entirely inappropriate. If the
purpose of the EITC is to make the recipients better off in some way, that
purpose is satisfied by allowing recipients to choose whether to work the
same number of hours and receive more money, or work fewer hours and
receive the same amount of money with additional leisure time.75 In this
way, if the EITC's work disincentives are thought of only in terms of the
labor supply that the credit increases or decreases, then the free choice of
potential recipients is ignored. Higher income earners are assumed to have
the choice between more income and more leisure, so perhaps one purpose of
the EITC ought to be making this choice available to lower income earners as
well. Alstott's argument is not that giving more leisure to lower income
earners ought to be the only intention of the EITC, but rather that this may be
one other purpose of the credit. In addition, economic arguments that focus
exclusively on "work incentives" in the context of the labor economy ignore
important other potential positive effects that the EITC may have:
[I]f EITC recipients use their additional time for nonmarket work,
such as care for children, the elderly, and the sick, their choice
benefits these other people and, potentially, society as a whole.
Thus, the potential labor-supply reductions that some policy
74. KAPLOW, supra note 70, at 174.
75. Alstott, supra note 28, at 554-55.
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analysts find so troubling actually would increase the well-being of
the poor. In economists' terms, these free and rational choices
between work and leisure maximize utility, which is the central
norm that animates traditional economic analysis.
76
In that case, even if the marginal rates created by the phase-out rate of the
EITC do result in some "work disincentives" as envisioned by traditional
labor economics, on balance the credit "maximizes utility" when utility is
understood in this broader sense.
B. The EITC and Families
At this point I will turn to the criticism that the EITC does not treat
differently situated individuals equally, but first I would like to pause for a
moment to consider so-called "marriage penalties," which are found
throughout the tax code.77 The basic idea behind this criticism of the tax code
is that because income tax rates and income limits do not always double for
married people who file joint tax returns, these people suffer a penalty for
their married status. 78 To illustrate using 2008 tax rates, if Miss A has an
income of $70,000 and files singly with no dependents, she will have a
standard deduction of $5,450, and her marginal tax rate will be 25%. 7 9 If she
marries Mr. B (who was previously in the same earning and income tax
situation as Miss A), they will have the option of filing separately or jointly.
If they are each married filing separately, they will be prohibited from taking
certain deductions that would otherwise be available to them.80 On the other
hand, if they file a married filing jointly return, they will have a standard
deduction that is double what each of them had separately, but their income
ceiling for the purposes of determining their tax rate will not double.
76. Id. at 555.
77. "Marriage penalties and bonuses in the federal individual income tax are
defined as the increase or decrease in taxes that some married couples incur because
they pay taxes as couples rather than as individuals." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2 (1997),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/0xx/doc7/marriage.pdf.
78. This is less true since the amendments to the tax rates promulgated by the
Bush Administration. In recent years the income ceiling for married taxpayers has
grown to almost double that of single taxpayers.
79. The marginal tax rate is the rate of tax due on the last dollar of income. For
2008 marginal tax rates and standard deductions, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
INSTRUCTIONS, FORM 1040, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i 1040.pdf.
80. For example, the education credits, the child care credit, and the EITC cannot
be claimed by taxpayers filing with the status married filing separately. In addition, if
one spouse itemizes deductions, the other spouse's standard deduction will be zero,
forcing that spouse also to itemize deductions. Internal Revenue Service, Frequently
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Therefore, their joint income of $140,000 will incur a marginal income tax
rate of 28% (this is the penalty part!). 81 So, although their total income
remains the same as before, the married couple pays tax at a higher rate than
two single individuals.
Of course, if Mr. B has no income and he marries Miss A, Miss A's
income tax rate will remain the same, but she will be entitled to twice the
standard deduction. Because of this possibility, it is often argued that
adjusting the tax rate so that taxpayers who are married filing jointly have an
income ceiling of twice their single counterparts really results in a "marriage
bonus." That is, switching from filing individually to married filing jointly
status results in the bonus of being entitled to twice the income of a single
person at the same tax rate. If only one member of the married couple is
working, there seems to be even less of an argument for allowing this kind of
bonus for the status of married filing jointly. In any case, people generally
seem to agree that an income tax system with progressive tax rates will
always result in either a "marriage bonus" or a "marriage penalty.' 82 Our
current tax system has tended to choose the so-called "marriage penalty."
83
This same criticism regarding the marriage penalty is also made of the
EITC. Since the credit has an income ceiling, and the number of children
counted levels off at two (three, starting in tax year 2009), married couples
are likely to be entitled to less of a credit than two unmarried people. For
instance, in tax year 2008, two unmarried people, each with two children and
each with annual earned income of $13,000, will each be entitled to the
maximum credit amount of $4,810.84 Therefore, even if these people live
together, and even if the children each of them claims as dependents are their
children with each other, these two taxpayers will be entitled to a combined
EITC of $9,620.85 However, if these same two people get married, they will
have to report a combined income of $26,000 and will be limited to the EITC
81. Tax Policy Center, Individual Income Tax Rates, Standard Deductions,
Personal Exemptions, and Filing Thresholds, http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts
/Content/ PDF/individual rates.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
82. For a more detailed explanation of the marriage bonus/penalty problem, see
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 77.
83. Id. at 2.
84. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 44.
85. An excellent example of this tax situation can be seen in Massachusetts.
Under current Massachusetts law, same-sex marriage is legal in the state, and same-
sex married couples must file as married on their state tax returns. However, because
their marriages are not recognized by the federal government, they must file their
federal tax returns individually. Therefore, a same-sex couple married in
Massachusetts with four children must file as two single taxpayers on their federal
return. Each taxpayer could claim two of the children on his return for EITC
purposes, thus maximizing the credit for which this family would be eligible.
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category of "two or more" dependent children, and the amount of their credit
will drop to $3,290.86 These numbers are illustrated in Table 4.
TABLE 487
Filing Status Income EITC Total
Single, two children each ($9,620 total) $17,810 each
A $13,000 $4,810 $35,620 total
B $13,000 $4,810
Married, four children ("2 $26,000 $3,290 $29,290 total
or more" for EITC
purposes)
Because of this significant difference in the amount of EITC these two
families will be entitled to ($9,620 for the unmarried family vs. $3,290 for the
married family), this aspect of the EITC seems to be working as a strong
disincentive for marriage.
In tax year 2008, the income ceiling for EITC recipients who are
married filing jointly is $3,000 higher at each credit level (no children, one
child, and two or more children) than it is for single taxpayers. 88 Beginning
in tax year 2009, in addition to the new category of "three or more children"
the income ceilings will be increased by $5,000 for married taxpayers filing
jointly. In this way, the tax system does try to address the problem of the
marriage penalty with regard to the EITC. However, allowing an extra
$3,000 (or $5,000) of income for married recipients of the EITC certainly
does not offset the radical difference in credit amounts in the above example.
In addition, there is no attempt in the current EITC to address the possibility
that a married family will have more children than its unmarried counterpart.
Therefore, under the current EITC model, two unmarried people with two
children each will always be entitled to a larger EITC than a married couple
with four children.
Lawrence Zelenak's proposal for revising the EITC as a family-size
adjustment to the minimum wage attempts to address at least one of the
86. Internal Revenue Service, Tips and Guidance for Estimating Credit Amount,
http://apps.irs.gov/app/eitc2008/Forward_2008_Calc.do (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
87. Again, these numbers will change, and the problem will be slightly remedied
in tax year 2009 by the addition of the "three or more children" category introduced
by the ARRA. However, for families with four or more children, the problem will
remain.
88. IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 29, at 5.
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problems introduced by the EITC "marriage penalty." Zelenak proposes
eliminating the cap on the number of children that taxpayers can claim for
EITC purposes. 89 In this way, a married couple with four children would be
able to claim all four of these children for the EITC, rather than being limited
to the category of "two or more" children ("three or more" beginning in tax
year 2009). Of course, there may be great political barriers to instituting a
change to the EITC of the kind that Zelenak proposes. With regard to the
problem of "marriage penalties" in the EITC, Zelenak acknowledges that any
version of the EITC that involves a phase-out plan will have to involve either
marriage penalties or marriage bonuses. 90 Since the intention of the EITC is
to focus benefits on low-income workers, the credit has to invoke a phase-out
rate or some kind of income ceiling so that the credit is not available to those
who earn more than the targeted income levels. Since penalties are
inevitable, the best (and perhaps only) response to this problem may be to
compromise and provide penalties (or bonuses) for everyone! As Zelenak
writes, "[b]y providing a joint return phase-out threshold slightly higher than
the phase-out threshold for single parents, current law adopts a version of this
compromise approach, but it is a version not far removed from the marriage
penalties-only approach."9' Perhaps a compromise that reaches a little further
and provides a bit more of a ceiling increase to married couples (the approach
hinted at in the 2009 ARRA changes), or allows categories with higher
numbers of children for married couples, would work to ease the imbalance
to some extent.
One additional solution to this problem may lie in addressing the
problem of single taxpayers who share households and child-rearing
responsibilities but are not married to each other.92 Since this seems to be the
category of people who are benefiting most from the current credit structure,
a solution focused on addressing this category may be more properly targeted.
Perhaps a new category of taxpayer could be created - unmarried filing
jointly. The tax system could require all taxpayers who share a household to
file with this status, and if they choose not to, they would be treated in a
manner similar to the current status of married filing separately. Since such a
radical change in the structure of the tax system may not be politically viable,
perhaps the change could be limited to recipients of the EITC. Having
stricter standards for EITC recipients than for other taxpayers is not a new
idea. There are currently very strict rules regarding claiming a child as a
89. Zelenak, supra note 8, at 341.
90. In what may be an attempt at definitional parity, Zelenak refers to marriage
bonuses as single penalties. See id. at 341-42.
91. Id. at 342 (footnotes omitted).
92. Again, consider the example of a same-sex couple, married for state law
purposes but not for federal law purposes.
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dependent for EITC purposes. 93 Requiring household reporting for EITC
recipients would also address multigenerational families. Under the current
system, in a household with a grandparent, a parent, and four children, the
grandparent can file an EITC tax return claiming two of the children and a
parent can claim the other two children on her return. Again, the cumulative
credit amount available to this family would be significantly larger than the
amount available to a family headed by a married couple.
There are two important complications to such a plan that would
certainly need to be addressed. First of all, Congress would need to revisit
the question of the EITC's original purpose before making such a change. If
the intention is to treat like financial situations alike, then such a change may
be sensible. However, perhaps Congress does intend to treat
multigenerational families or families headed by an unmarried couple
differently from a family headed by a married couple. This seems unlikely,
but if that is the case, then those intentions need to be addressed in any
changes made to the structure of the credit and its marriage penalties.
Second, requiring EITC recipient families to file as "households," while non-
EITC recipient families with the same structure (either multigenerational or
headed by an unmarried couple) continue to file individually, may involve a
deep inequity in which the tax system should not engage. Should we require
EITC recipient families to define their family structure differently than their
higher-earning counterparts? This may counter some of the benefits reaped
by running the EITC through the tax system in the first place. Requiring
different family structure definitions may reintroduce a stigma to the status of
EITC recipient that administration through the tax system is currently able to
avoid. On the other hand, focusing the benefits of the EITC on those who
most need it, and ensuring equal treatment and fair distribution of the benefits
available through the EITC, may require some solution of this kind and may
justify any inequity it introduces.
If the purpose of the EITC is merely to offset the burden of payroll taxes
on those taxpayers earning the least, then it makes sense that all taxpayers
with equal income should be treated equally by the EITC. The payroll taxes
are imposed equally on taxpayers, regardless of the number of children they
have and regardless of whether or not they are married. Therefore, if
offsetting payroll taxes is the intention of the EITC, then the sole determinant
of the amount of the credit should be income level, and the number of
children and marital status should be irrelevant.
However, as is by now clear, the EITC is used for more than merely
offsetting payroll taxes. The credit is also viewed as a supplement to the
traditional welfare system, offering government assistance to those who do
not qualify for welfare because they have earned income, but who still live
93. Internal Revenue Service, Tips and Guidance for Determining Qualifying
Children for EITC, http://apps.irs.gov/app/eitc2008/ForwardQualifyingChild.do
(last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
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with income levels that put them below the poverty line. If this is a goal of
the EITC, then it makes more sense that differences in family structure should
result in different credit amounts. After all, the poverty level itself is relative
to the size of the family. It is clear that a married couple with two children
will need more income in order to enjoy the same standard of living as a
single person with the same income. Therefore, the amount of the credit and
the income level at which it phases out should reflect the differences among
families of different sizes if the EITC is intended to be a response to the
poverty level.
The problem remains that the EITC only goes so far in responding to
differences in family structure. The limitation to three categories of taxpayers
(no children, one child, and two or more children), with the addition of a
fourth category beginning in tax year 2009, does not account for the variety
of family structures among U.S. taxpayers. If, as I wrote in the previous
paragraph, the EITC is intended to be a response to the changing poverty
levels encountered by families of different sizes, then limiting the number of
children a taxpayer can claim for EITC purposes limits the effectiveness of
the credit in this regard. After all, the poverty level for a married couple with
five children is significantly higher than the level for a married couple with94
only two children. And yet, for EITC purposes, in tax year 2008, these two
families are treated the same way.95  This clearly results in an uneven
treatment of different family structures. And this relation between the
amount of the EITC and the official national poverty level is not trivial. In
2001, 4.7 million people had their income levels raised above the poverty line
96because of the EITC. If the poverty level is a meaningful number,
representing a subsistence level of earnings for taxpayers and their children,
then perhaps it should play a larger role in determining the amount of EITC
for which families (especially larger families) are eligible.
It is important to note here that this limitation on the number of children
a taxpayer can claim for tax purposes is not present throughout the Code.
Indeed, there are no limitations on the number of children a taxpayer can
claim for the dependent exemption or for the child tax credit.97 So why this
94. For 2008, the U.S. federal poverty level for a family of four is $21,200, in the
48 contiguous states. For a family of 7 that amount rises to $32,000. Annual Update
of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 3971-72 (Jan. 23, 2008).
95. Beginning with tax year 2009, the family with 5 children will move up to the
EITC category of "three or more children," which will go some way towards
alleviating this difference, but, of course, the criticism still remains, since the larger
family gets no larger credit to account for the last two children.
96. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1677.
97. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 501, ExEMPTIONS,
STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 11 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p50l.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) [hereinafter IRS
PUBLICATION 501]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 972, CtULD TAX
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difference in the EITC? There are differing theories about why the EITC
treats number of children differently than the rest of the Code. Some critics
believe that the limitation on the number of children for whom a taxpayer can
receive credit, for EITC purposes, is intended as a disincentive to having
more children. According to this theory, if the EITC were available in larger
amounts for each additional child that a taxpayer had, there would be a strong
incentive to have more children in order to receive a larger credit. This
limitation is the government's way of telling the working poor that they
should not have more children until they can afford to care for them without
the help of the EITC. This argument seems at least partly problematic,
though, since it does not seem likely that an additional tax credit of about
$2,000 a year would be enough of an incentive to encourage families earning
only about $12,000 a year to incur the costs of another child. Indeed, the idea
that family size calculations are made on the basis of tax credits seems a bit
odd altogether.
However, even if the limitation is not intended as a disincentive, there is
a more convincing argument that it is intended as a "stem message" to the
working poor about increasing their family size and having more children for
whom they would have difficulty caring financially. If this is the reason for
the limitation on the number of children, it is, again, an interesting question
whether or not the intended recipients are getting the message. And what,
exactly, is the intended effect? Does the government intend to prevent the
growth of families in the lowest income levels only? And, if that is the
intention, what is the point of punishing those families who have already
grown? If the people who feel the effects of this "stern message" are the
children of low-income parents who have four or more children, then perhaps
the government should rethink whether or not this is an effective strategy.
Surely we do not want to punish children in order to make an impression on
their parents.
C. Accounting for Wealth
The EITC is intended to be a response to the needs of people who have
earned income but who do not have enough money to satisfy their basic
needs. Because the credit focuses on earned income, pre-existing wealth
could be a problem for the EITC. After all, capital gains and dividend
income is not "earned" income within the definitions of the income tax
98
code. Beyond that, any accumulated wealth that a taxpayer has is not
income at all, and "[t]he current EITC .. .does not incorporate a wealth
requirement of any kind."99 But surely a taxpayer with large amounts of
CREDIT 2 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf (last visited
Mar. 14, 2009) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 972].
98. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2).
99. Alstott, supra note 28, at 571.
[Vol. 74
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/2
WHO'S AFRAID OF REDISTRIBUTION?
wealth who either receives capital gains or dividend income, or who lives off
of her accumulated wealth, is not an intended recipient of the EITC.
Therefore, the Code needs to eliminate these sorts of taxpayers from the
recipient pool of the EITC.
The current version of the EITC does attempt to exclude taxpayers with
other sources of income from receiving the credit, but as Alstott points out,
there is still no requirement that EITC recipients report assets on their returns,
as long as those assets are not producing income.100 So the taxpayer with
$100,000 stuffed under his mattress may still be eligible for the EITC, but the
taxpayer with $100,000 in the stock market, who earns dividends or capital
gains from his investments, is likely to be ineligible for the EITC because of
the current requirements.
Within the current EITC, taxpayers must report investment income
separately, and if it exceeds a certain amount (currently $2,900), that taxpayer
will be ineligible for the credit. 0 1 This measuring of dividend and capital
gain income serves as a proxy to an actual reporting of amounts of
accumulated wealth and still works within the confines of the larger income
tax system, since the amount of dividend and capital gain income is reported
elsewhere on the taxpayer's income tax return. However, some critics argue
that this extra reporting requirement makes claiming the EITC significantly
more difficult, and thus lowers the chances that eligible taxpayers will realize
that they are eligible. In this way, these critics argue, the EITC participation
rate will drop even lower if such a reporting requirement is introduced. 02 In
addition, while this dividend and capital gains reporting requirement does
capture some accumulated wealth held by potential EITC recipients, it does
not encompass all such wealth. Therefore, even with this remedial reporting
requirement, many taxpayers with accumulated wealth or other sorts of non-
taxable income will not be required to report that wealth or income anywhere
on their income tax returns, and they will remain eligible for the EITC.
The problem in the current system stems from the fact that the EITC
uses the same definition of income as the U.S. federal income tax system
generally. Since the U.S. federal income tax system does not currently tax
wealth, there is no built-in way to measure that wealth. °3 The EITC has
traditionally used the income tax system definition of income as a way to
simplify the program and to keep it incorporated with the general tax system.
This trade-off between trying to keep the administration of the EITC as
100. Id. at 571-72.
101. Internal Revenue Service, EITC Thresholds and Tax Law Updates,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=150513,00.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2009).
102. For a discussion of participation rates, see infra Part IV.D. 1.
103. A tax on wealth would require annual reporting of assets held by a taxpayer,
and a commensurate tax on the current value of those assets. Our tax system does not
require such reporting, and, as it stands, the government only taxes income
accumulated in a particular tax year.
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simple as possible and trying to ensure fairness by only allowing people in
need to claim the credit makes choosing the best strategy difficult. Here
again it seems that if the policy objectives of the EITC could be made clearer,
then the choices regarding how best to administer the credit would be made
easier.
D. Difficulties Related to Claiming the EITC
1. Participation Rates
Even though the EITC is widely claimed and clearly affects the lives of
many taxpayers, there is still a problem of participation. That is, many
taxpayers and their families who are eligible for the EITC are not claiming
it. Of course, the number of people who fall into this category is difficult
to estimate, since the very problem comes from the fact that they are not
reporting themselves! People in this country who earn below the minimum
amount required to pay taxes are not actually required to file an income tax
return at all. 1°5 In order to claim the EITC, however, these same people
would be required to file a return. 6 Since in many of these instances no
returns are being filed, it will always be difficult to estimate how many
eligible households are not receiving the credit. One estimate claims that
over 4.3 million taxpayers who were eligible for the EITC did not claim the
credit. Of that number, about 28% represented households with three or more
qualifying children.' 07 In the current system, if a taxpayer files a return and is
in fact eligible for the credit but does not claim the EITC, the IRS will notify
the taxpayer of her eligibility and she will likely ultimately receive the credit.
But the taxpayer who has so little income that she is not required to file a
return will likely not file, will not learn about the EITC, and so ultimately will
not receive it.
One important measure that many groups have taken in order to address
this problem is to inform people about the EITC and the eligibility
requirements. These outreach programs are often held in public housing
projects or other low-income areas, in order to inform income earners about
104. In a recent Congressional hearing on the EITC, many lawmakers were more
focused on the lack of participation than on noncompliance. "I would think the IRS
would be outraged that so many who qualify are not applying for that money," said
Representative Xavier Becerra. Diane Freda, Lawmakers Say IRS Must Do More to
Heighten Taxpayer Awareness of EITC, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 14, 2007, at G-10.
105. For the tax year 2008, married couples filing jointly do not have to file an
income tax return if their joint income is below $17,900. Internal Revenue Service,
To File or Not to File, IRS Tax Tip 2009-27, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom
/article/O,,id= 105097,00.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
106. Id.
107. Philip J. Harmelink, Thomas M. Porcano, James A. Richardson & William
M. VanDenburgh, The Challenge of the EITC, 100 TAX NoTES 955, 957 (2003).
[Vol. 74
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/2
WHO'S AFRAID OF REDISTRIBUTION?
the EITC and what they must do in order to claim their credit. The programs
range from informing people about the existence and purpose of the EITC to
helping people file their income tax returns in order to claim the credit. The
IRS itself sponsors the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance ("VITA") program,
and activist organizations such as the Children's Defense Fund, the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, and countless
community development and neighborhood action organizations have spent
millions of dollars on outreach in order to inform taxpayers of their rights
with regard to the EITC. 10 8 VITA sites are located throughout the country,
and they are just what they sound like - volunteers assist low-income
taxpayers in completing and filing their income tax returns, facilitating the
claiming of millions of dollars in EITC. This program, and the organizations
that host the sites, operates in low-income communities to inform taxpayers
about the EITC and about what they must do to claim the credit. Outreach
programs such as these are very likely to increase awareness of, and therefore
use of, the EITC. In addition, outreach programs may reduce the need among
EITC recipients to use paid preparers and Refund Anticipation Loans
("RALs").1°9 Unless the intended recipients are aware of and claim the
credit, no amount of improvements in the drafting and administration of the
EITC will change its effectiveness. In this regard, outreach is extremely
important.
2. Noncompliance
Noncompliance in the EITC is as much a problem as is noncompliance
in other areas of the income tax system. Indeed, the IRS estimates that
approximately $250 billion to $300 billion of tax revenue is lost annually due
to noncompliance in all areas of the Code. With regard to the EITC,
approximately $10 billion annually, or one-third of all EITC payments, are
estimated to be noncompliant." 0 In addition to these problems of
noncompliance, approximately half of all EITC returns are estimated to be
filed in error."1
There seem to be two possible explanations for these large
noncompliance numbers: this noncompliance could be the result of
intentional fraud, or it could be unintentional error incurred because of the
complexity of the return system for the EITC. I have already discussed the
problem of the complexity of the EITC in several of the previous sections of
this article. 112 In general, complexity seems to be a problem because of the
conflict between wanting the administration of the EITC to be fair, while still
108. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1674.
109. For a discussion of Refund Anticipation Loans, see infra Part IV.D.3.
110. Harmelink, Porcano, Richardson & VanDenburgh, supra note 107, at 955.
111. Id.
112. See supra Parts III.C-D, IV.B. 1.
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wanting the credit to be easily available to those who need it. This issue
comes up with regard to the credit amount and family size, and also with
regard to the question of preexisting wealth. Large amounts of
noncompliance may be another argument for the simplification of the EITC
(as it is an argument for the simplification of the tax code in general), but
determining just how much noncompliance comes from the problem of
complexity, and therefore how much of a difference simplification would
make, would likely require much empirical research. On the other hand, if
the noncompliance with regard to the EITC is primarily a result of intentional
fraud, then other steps must be taken to address this problem.
The U.S. federal income tax system relies in large part on self-reporting.
Because the administration of the E1TC is housed in the income tax system,
unlike almost all other social welfare programs, the EITC also has a self-
reporting component. Most other social benefits programs require some
proof of eligibility, and have some external monitoring component.
However, as I discussed earlier in this article, 1 3 part of the appeal of the
EITC is that it does not have the stringent reporting and eligibility
requirements that, for instance, the TANF program has. Again, there may be
significant policy reasons to maintain the self-reporting status quo of the
EITC, even if that means incurring the risk of intentional fraud.
In 2003 the IRS announced a revised plan that would require
precertification of some of the individuals claiming the EITC.114 Under this
proposal, the certification process would require "higher risk" taxpayers to
establish their relationship with any children they were claiming for EITC
purposes and prove those children's satisfaction of the residency test before
the taxpayers file their returns. 1 5 These elements of the EITC claim are the
hardest to prove (and to disprove), and the IRS is worried that "[d]ue to the
fact that targeted taxpayers come from a low-income environment,
subsequent collections of audit amounts are problematic."'"16 So if taxpayers
from this certain class fraudulently claim children on their returns, it will be
very difficult for the IRS to recover the money if the government only finds
out about the fraud later. This may be true, and it may be even harder for the
IRS to successfully recover overpayments made to these taxpayers than to
others, but there are certainly some policy and social justice concerns about
allowing a precertification process such as this to go forward.
The IRS proposal regarding EITC precertification for certain "high-risk"
taxpayers would require the targeted taxpayers to complete extensive
paperwork and obtain third-party affidavits in order to prove the truth of
certain claims on their tax returns. Such extensive proof is not required of
most taxpayers because, as I mentioned earlier, the U.S. system relies
113. See supra Part III.D.
114. Harmelink, Porcano, Richardson & VanDenburgh, supra note 107, at 959.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 960.
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primarily on self-reporting. So there seems to be a significant concern about
"the social justice in requiring extensive documentation that is not required
by other taxpayers, despite wide ranging noncompliance." '117 Indeed, the
numbers at the beginning of this section reveal that less than five percent of
the loss of revenue from noncompliance relates to the EITC. This is not to
diminish the importance of that lost revenue, but the IRS's reasons for
wanting to step up documentation with regard to EITC payments (namely that
these taxpayers do not have a lot of money, so they will be hard to recover
from) is not the kind of policy argument that justifies such a difference in
treatment. Noncompliance with regard to the EITC is clearly a significant
problem, and intentional fraud in EITC claims may be a problem that the
government must address.' 8 However, in this instance, the government's
beliefs about the types of people who claim the EITC are allowing this
particular kind of noncompliance to erode equal treatment of all taxpayers.
3. Cost to Recipients
Through the years, the United States has seen a rise in the number of
professional tax preparation agencies offering services to American
taxpayers. Some think that the rise in the use of these services has been a
direct response to the increasing complexity in the U.S. income tax system. 11
9
One significant problem facing those who advocate the maintenance of the
EITC is the high percentage of EITC recipients who use paid tax preparers to
assist them in filing their returns. Indeed, it seems that approximately 70% of
taxpayers who claim the EITC have used a paid tax preparer. In contrast,
only about 60 percent of non-EITC recipient taxpayers used paid preparers.121
Perhaps this means that filing for the EITC is even more complicated than
non-EITC filings, requiring those who wish to claim the EITC to hire
professional help when completing their returns. Or, what seems more likely,
paid tax preparers are seeking out EITC-eligible individuals in order to offer
their services and collect their fees.
Even more concerning than the high usage of paid preparers is the
number of EITC recipients who receive RALs at exorbitant fees. For
instance, in 2003, 57% of RAL recipients received the EITC. 12 These loans
cost EITC recipients $519 million in fees, but about two-thirds of these
117. Id. at 961.
118. There does not seem to be clear empirical data showing how much of the
EITC noncompliance is a result of confusion in the face of the EITC's complexity and
how much is intentional fraud. Such data would need to be uncovered before any
radical government response to fraudulent noncompliance would be justified.
119. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic
Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REv. 53, 70 (2007).
120. Harmelink, Porcano, Richardson & VanDenburgh, supra note 107, at 957.
121. Marguerite Casey Found., supra note 18, at 1682.
122. Id. at 1684.
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individuals did not realize that the RAL was, in fact, a loan. 123 RALs are
often offered by professional tax preparers to their customers on the basis of
their anticipated refunds. Using an RAL allows the taxpayer to take the
refund amount home that same day, but at a significant cost, usually around
$100. "Given that it takes the IRS only 10 days, on average, to process an
electronically filed return and electronically deposit a refund into a taxpayer's
bank account, the overall concern is that low-income taxpayers may useAls,,124RALs unnecessarily .... In order to collect these large loan fees, paid tax
preparers are likely to encourage EITC recipients to take an RAL, and
therefore the use of RALs is likely much higher among people using paid tax
preparers. Finally, in order to receive an electronic deposit of the refund
amount, the taxpayer must have a bank account into which that money can be
deposited. However, many low-income individuals and families do not have
bank accounts, and so are not eligible to have their refunds direct-deposited.
This just extends the amount of time that it will take the IRS to get the refund
to the taxpayer, and thus increases the chance that the taxpayer will be
tempted to take an RAL.
Since the EITC is aimed at the lowest-earning and neediest taxpayers in
the United States, and since the credit is intended to alleviate some of the
financial pressures experienced by these families, it is worrisome that these
same neediest families may be spending a significant amount of their credit
(and refund) on unnecessary services related to receiving the credit. Indeed,
if a taxpayer receives an EITC payment of $1,735, that individual could
expect to pay $220 in tax preparation and RAL fees - an amount that
represents 12.7% of the total credit. 125 In order to avoid this dilution of the
effect of the EITC, the government, in conjunction with public service
organizations, must continue to work to inform people about the real cost of
RALs and also offer help to EITC recipients in completing and submitting
their tax returns. The same outreach programs I discussed with relation to the
participation rates of the EITC 126 can be used to meet these needs. Having
more volunteer preparers available would also help to reduce the numbers of
people who currently diminish the net value of their credit by using paid
preparers to file their returns. Another possible solution to the problem of
RALs would be more government regulation of the process, including federal
limits on the amount of the fees that companies offering such services could
charge. This problem must be addressed if the government wants to ensure
that the EITC is properly available in its full amount to those for whom it is
intended. Outreach programs and the government should also work to ensure




126. See supra Part IV.D. 1.
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that direct deposit of refund amounts. Making this option available to EITC
recipients would likely reduce the need for them to take an RAL.
A related concern regarding the use of the EITC is the form in which
most recipients get their payments. The EITC is available to eligible
taxpayers as a monthly payment over the course of the taxable year, as an
addition to that taxpayer's paycheck, the so-called Advanced Earned Income
Credit ("AEIC"). However, receiving the EITC in this form requires
completing and filing additional paperwork, and most EITC-eligible
taxpayers are not even aware that such an option exists. Therefore, most
EITC recipients receive their credit in the form of a one-time lump sum
payment in the Spring, after they have filed their tax returns for the previous
year. One concern about this method is that the requirements of other social
benefits programs will encourage EITC recipients to spend this money soon
after they receive it, rather than using it over the course of the year to help the
family with their normal living expenses. If EITC recipients place the lump
sum of their refunds in a bank account, these retained assets may ultimately
disqualify the recipient from benefits to which they would otherwise be
entitled. Perhaps this means that outreach should also encourage EITC-
eligible taxpayers to participate in the AEIC program, thus receiving their
credit in monthly payments over the course of the taxable year.
E. Proposals for Change
1. Raising the EITC vs. Raising the Minimum Wage
In recent years there has been much discussion of the importance of
raising the national minimum wage. 27  This discussion fits together
interestingly with a discussion of the EITC. This debate also requires a clear
identification of what purposes are intended to be served. If raising the
minimum wage is intended to help working families, a more effective way to
achieve the same end may involve raising (or improving) the EITC. Many
minimum wage workers are high school students or retirees. If the minimum
wage is increased, then some benefits will be directed towards them, rather
than towards working families. Since the EITC focuses its benefits directly
towards low-income earners with children, while still allowing some benefits
to single or childless workers, raising the EITC would focus those benefits
more explicitly on working families.128 Another significant contrast between
127. The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, §§ 8101-8104,
121 Stat. 112, 188-89, ultimately raised the federal minimum wage to $7.25 per hour,
and President Obama has promised to raise it further, to $9.50 per hour by 2011. See
Obama-Biden, Plan to Combat Poverty, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/poverty
/#make-work-pay (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
128. The EITC goes some way towards addressing this concern by imposing a
minimum age requirement on childless recipients. In order to receive a credit in the
"no children" category, the taxpayer must be age 25 or over. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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the minimum wage and the EITC lies in determining who provides the
benefits. One standard argument regarding the minimum wage is that
employers must bear the brunt of any increase in wages.' 29 In contrast, the
EITC is a government program, and any increase would be borne by the
government. This increase in expenditure would have to be matched by an
increase in revenue, which is an important consideration in determining
whether expanding the EITC is a possibility.
If the minimum wage were to be increased as a result of recent debates,
it will be important to determine just how this would (or should) impact the
EITC. If minimum wage levels were to be raised, one potential result would
be that fewer people will be eligible for the EITC. This may be an acceptable
result, but it may be that eligibility levels should be raised in response to an
increase in minimum wage levels. Again, answering this question will
depend on articulating just what it is that the EITC is meant to achieve. If the
EITC is meant to be a response to the poverty level, then an increase in the
minimum wage need not affect the eligibility levels or amounts given under
the EITC. However, if the EITC is meant to be a benefit available to the
lowest-income earners in the United States, then increasing the minimum
wage will require an increase in the EITC eligibility levels as well. In that
way, the lowest-income earners will continue to be eligible for the EITC,
even with their new earnings levels.'
30
2. Integrating the EITC and Welfare
Some of the most withering criticisms of the EITC are related to the
very high marginal rates brought on by the credit.' 31 Not only can these high
marginal rates have the effect of creating powerful work disincentives, but
also, with regard to the first dollars of income earned, the marginal rates can
seem like a punishment for working.
Because, TANF welfare subsidies are often significantly reduced with
the first dollar of income earned, there is inevitably a huge drop in
government subsidies at the very lowest income levels. People who have
been receiving TANF but begin to earn income will lose their entire welfare
subsidy, but will only begin to receive the EITC in very small amounts. Only
when they reach higher income levels will they qualify for the maximum
amounts of the EITC. A more sensible system would be one that more
129. A detailed discussion of arguments regarding the minimum wage is outside
of the scope of this paper. For an explanation of the minimum wage and its effect on
the economy and on working families, see DAvID NEUMARK & WILLIAM L.
WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES (2008).
130. Historically, income ceilings and EITC amounts have increased slightly each
year. If a minimum wage increase had the effect of causing inflation, any EITC
increase would have to adjust accordingly, to ensure that recipients were,
economically speaking, in at least the same situation as before.
131. See supra Part IV.A.
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smoothly progresses in subsidy amounts from non-earners to very low
earners. If it were possible to integrate the phasing-out of welfare subsidies
with the subsidy for low-income earners that is currently available through
the EITC, then the high marginal rates currently experienced by both subsidy
recipients would likely be ameliorated. However, because TANF is
administered through independent state agencies and the EITC is
administered through the federal income tax system, there is currently a
significant gap between the administration and the policy-making of the two
systems. As Kaplow points out, the current system and its "apparent
deviation from optimality seems to be a product of unintegrated thinking."
'' 32
Integrating these two programs would require bringing discussions of
welfare back into the public eye, and so it seems unlikely to happen in the
near future. However, if it were possible to integrate the phasing-out of
welfare subsidies with the subsidy for low-income earners that is currently
available through the EITC, then the high marginal rates currently
experienced by both subsidy recipients would likely be ameliorated, possibly
to optimal levels. As Kaplow argues, "it is artificial and misleading to view
components of the system in a vacuum. It is also inappropriate to allow
arbitrary properties, such as phase-out targets, to guide analysis." 133 An
integrated approach to subsidies for no-income and low-income earners
would address this problem. However, it would also likely require the EITC
to be removed from the administration of the income tax system, which
. ... . . 134
would eliminate the benefits of this form of administration. If it is the
EITC's existence as a refundable income tax credit that makes it so politically
viable, then it is, at a minimum, unclear how integration with a non-tax
system federal subsidy would affect the EITC's future.
3. President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
In November 2005 President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform published its proposals for change in the federal income tax system,
entitled Simple, Fair, & Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax
System. 135 This quite thorough report suggested changes to the tax system as
a whole and included proposals for reform of the current EITC. According to
the proposal, the changes would better ensure progressivity in the tax system
by incorporating diverse elements of the current system. Under the panel's
proposal, six of the current credits or deductions aimed at families and/or
low-income earners would be combined so that only two credits would
remain. The current standard deduction, personal exemption, child tax credit,
132. KAPLOW, supra note 70, at 168.
133. Id. at 169.
134. For a discussion of these benefits, see supra Part III.D.
135. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, &
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and head of household increase in the standard deduction amount would be
combined into a "Family Credit."' 36 The current EITC and refundable child
tax credit would be combined into a "Work Credit."'
137
The Panel's arguments for making these changes rely primarily on the
increase in simplicity introduced into the tax system by reducing the number
of credits available to taxpayers and by combining their eligibility
requirements. Under the current system, there are varying eligibility
requirements for the various credits available to taxpayers. For instance, a
child must be under 17 in order to qualify for the child tax credit, but may be
up to 23 for EITC purposes.' 38 This difference requires that taxpayers who
may qualify for both credits work through two different sets of rules for the
same child. Indeed, none of the justifications for the existence of either the
child tax credit or the EITC seem to adequately explain why there should be
such a radical difference in the eligibility requirements for these two credits.
On the other hand, since the EITC is aimed at low-income earners and the
child tax credit is available to all taxpayers with children under the age of 17,
that may serve as sufficient justification for the difference. Perhaps we want
to make a larger credit available for a longer period of time to those who
qualify for the EITC, and the same is not true for all taxpayers with children.
Of course, in order to be able to make a determination like this, the
justifications for and purposes behind these credits would need to be made
clear, something that is still lacking.
The Panel claims that adjusting these qualifications so that they align
more closely need not radically change the credit system as such. "The
Panel's objective is not to fundamentally change the amount or availability of
these benefits, but to ensure that these provisions serve their intended
purposes as efficiently as possible and with greater simplicity and
transparency."' 139 They argue that the complexity of the current system is
unjustified and has the negative result of making the EITC effectively
unavailable to many of its intended recipients. The Panel points to the
problem of paid preparers, the high level of error in EITC claims, and the
high rate of eligible individuals who do not claim the credit as evidence of the
current EITC's problems. The proposed Work Credit would, the Panel
claims, radically simplify the process so that individuals could claim the
credit themselves or elect to have the IRS compute their credit for them.
40
While having the IRS compute the credit is a way to avoid the need for paid
preparers, such an option is currently available with regard to the EITC.
However, presumably allowing the IRS to calculate your credit for you will
take longer than having a paid preparer do it, and so the same reasons that
people currently seek out paid preparers (speed, convenience, and simplicity)
136. Id. at 63.
137. Id. at 63-64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 64.
140. Id. at 68.
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will continue to influence their choices. In addition, simplifying the process
will not necessarily induce those who do not currently claim the credit to
make the effort to file for it. Indeed, without an accompanying outreach
program aimed at community support and awareness-raising, this new
proposal will not likely have any more success on that front than does the
current system.
Interestingly, the Panel includes in its proposal an explanation of why
they believe that the EITC must phase out over higher income levels. In the
course of its work, the Panel designed a potential scheme that "included a
Work Credit without a phase-out and an additional tax rate that, together,
would provide marginal tax rates that increase steadily as taxpayers earn
more, instead of the marginal tax rate spikes found in the current EITC
structure."' 14 1 The elimination of the high marginal tax rates created by the
EITC does seem to be a valuable addition, but ultimately the Panel decided
not to make the Work Credit available to all taxpayers, because "the
compliance costs and additional burden imposed on all taxpayers outweighed
the potential benefits of simplicity and smoother increases in marginal tax
rates for eligible Work Credit recipients."' 142 The Panel decided that keeping
the Work Credit focused on the same group for whom the current EITC is
available was ultimately a more feasible option and was more likely to keep
in place the progressive tax structure of the current system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama denied that he believed in
"redistribution," but he has committed to continuing, and even expanding, the
EITC program. Indeed, the changes to the EITC introduced in the ARRA are
a step in the right direction. Whether or not politicians wish to identify the
EITC as a program for the redistribution of wealth, it remains one of the
largest wealth transfer programs currently operating in the United States.
Given the long history of the program, as well as its extensive reach,
understanding the mechanics, the rationale, and the success of the EITC
seems critical now, as the credit grows even more important.
The EITC remains a more politically viable transfer and subsidy
payment than many others that are available only to those who do not earn
income. This political viability, while not a complete justification for the
maintenance of any system, should not be too quickly discounted either.
Since its inception, support for the EITC has been quite strong, and markedly
stronger than support for programs such as TANF, which are often considered
much more controversial. In any case, the mere fact that the EITC has been
largely supported in the almost thirty years since it was introduced should, at
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a minimum, be considered strong evidence of its effectiveness and political
viability.
One significant hurdle faced by supporters of the EITC and those who
propose maintaining and expanding the credit lies in the continuing lack of an
explicit purpose. While the EITC has continued to enjoy strong political
support, it has also continued to suffer from an absence of any clearly
articulated purpose. Many reasons for its existence have been proposed, and
it may be the case that the EITC's continued presence in fact satisfies many
needs in the government's redistributive system. The EITC's ability to offset
the burden of payroll taxes on the lowest income earners has regularly been a
strong reason for maintaining the subsidy. However, this purpose cannot
justify the increase in subsidy amounts for larger families or married couples.
If the EITC were intended merely to offset payroll taxes, then the amount
offered through the credit should exactly match the amount collected in
payroll taxes. That is currently true only for taxpayers with no children.
Another reason for maintaining the EITC that has been regularly cited by its
supporters is the credit's ability to ease the burden experienced by those who
lose their welfare subsidies as they begin earning income. The EITC is able
to subsidize low-income earners without explicitly changing the requirements
for receiving TANF. In this way, low-income earners are not punished for
going to work, and the work disincentives that many find in the welfare
system are somewhat alleviated. Finally, the current model for the EITC is
often justified on the grounds that the credit is intended to help families in
proportion to their size, in the same way that other federal redistributive
programs account for family size in determining the subsidy amount.
However, again, the EITC only responds to family size to a certain extent,
since the credit stops increasing once a family has two children (three
children, beginning in tax year 2009).
Regardless of the purpose behind the credit, as long as the EITC
continues as a part of the tax system, it makes the most sense for its intended
recipients to know about it and file for it. The current system is under-
utilized, and many low-income earners who qualify for the EITC either do
not know about the credit or fail to file for it, and so do not receive it.
Alternatively, many of those who do file for the credit do so through paid
preparers and use RALs to receive their credit, immediately using a large
portion of the credit to pay the costs associated with that loan. Both of these
problems could be addressed through a better public outreach system
notifying people of the existence of the EITC and helping them to file for the
credit. Awareness of the program can be increased through various social
services agencies (and indeed, already happens in these contexts), but
assistance in filing for the credit is a problem that requires more specific
expertise. Currently, private groups seem to have taken on the responsibility
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of providing outreach and assistance with regard to the EITC.143 This model
is actually quite good, since the groups tend to be focused on the particular
problems of the EITC and may be best able to help qualified EITC recipients
move through the system. As a result of their concentrated work in this
particular area, these groups may ultimately become the source of proposed
changes to the EITC, potentially making it more efficient and more effective.
The idea of effecting wealth redistribution directly through the income
tax system, so that refundable tax credits can work as a subsidy to earned
income, is a good one. It may be true that the American system can be
improved, and there are, as I have shown in this article, already suggestions
for ways to effect that improvement. However, whatever changes may be
made to the EITC in the future, it will be important to maintain its central
characteristics of being administered through the income tax system,
subsidizing the earnings of low-income workers, and varying in amount in
response to family size.
143. There are a variety of different groups currently offering such assistance.
Some examples include Community Development Corporations (CDCs), local bar
associations, and student organizations, among others.
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